CODE · DIGITAL TRUST PRODUCT / SOLUTION PROFILE

QuantumSafe Code & Firmware Signing
Controlled pilot

Protect software, container and device release chains with governed signing and long-lived verification.

CUSTOMER PROBLEM

Protect software, container and device release chains with governed signing and long-lived verification.

Software and device releases may remain trusted for years. Compromised signing keys or quantum-vulnerable verification paths can undermine the entire supply chain.

Controlled pilot
Portfolio class
Digital trust product / solution profile
Public profile
2026.07
Version rule
Confirmed in quotation / release record

PRODUCT-SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION FLOW

How QuantumSafe Code & Firmware Signing operates from input to evidence.

CI/CD, artifact repositories, HSM, SBOM systems, device update and verification paths. Signed release corpus, approval logs, key-rotation tests and verifier compatibility report.

01

CI/CD produces immutable release candidate

Software, container and firmware signing

02

Policy engine verifies provenance and approvals

Secure Boot and OTA update trust chains

03

Signing service resolves protected release key

Offline or HSM-backed signing keys

04

HSM signs artifact and manifest

Maker-checker and release approval

05

Repository publishes signed package and SBOM

SBOM/provenance linkage

06

Device or platform verifies before install

Key rotation, revocation and emergency recovery

NAMED COMPONENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

What QuantumSafe Code & Firmware Signing contains and what each component does.

The descriptions below state concrete technical behaviour rather than generic support language.

01

Software, container and firmware signing

Signs executable packages, containers, firmware images and release manifests using profiles matched to each platform and verifier.

02

Secure Boot and OTA update trust chains

Builds trust chains for Secure Boot and OTA updates, including root rotation, rollback protection, anti-rollback counters and recovery images.

03

Offline or HSM-backed signing keys

Keeps release keys offline or in HSM custody, separates production from test keys and prevents CI workers from accessing private material.

04

Maker-checker and release approval

Requires maker-checker approval with release identity, source commit, build provenance, vulnerability state and target environment before signing.

05

SBOM/provenance linkage

Links the signature to SBOM, provenance attestation, build metadata and release ticket so the artifact can be traced to its approved source.

06

Key rotation, revocation and emergency recovery

Defines compromise response, emergency revocation, replacement-key rollout and legacy-verifier strategy before a signing key is activated.

CUSTOMER OUTCOMES
  • Release approval workflow
  • Offline or protected signing keys
  • Firmware/secure-boot migration path
INTEGRATION BOUNDARY

CI/CD, artifact repositories, HSM, SBOM systems, device update and verification paths.

DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS

On-premises trust service

CA, signing, TSA or release components run in a customer-controlled trust boundary with protected keys.

Dedicated private platform

Service components run in a dedicated private-cloud or appliance topology with HSM/QSCD integration.

Coexistence migration

Classical and target profiles are introduced in phases with relying-party testing, evidence and rollback gates.

EVIDENCE REQUIRED
  • Signed release corpus, approval logs, key-rotation tests and verifier compatibility report.
  • Version and configuration manifest for: CI/CD, artifact repositories, HSM, SBOM systems, device update and verification paths.
  • Negative, failure and recovery tests for “Repository publishes signed package and SBOM” and “Device or platform verifies before install”.
  • Signed acceptance record, accountable owner, published limitations and next review date.
STANDARDS & PROFILES
  • Code-signing and firmware-signing profiles
  • Secure Boot / OTA trust chains
  • SBOM / provenance concepts
  • HSM-backed release controls

PRODUCT-SPECIFIC BOUNDARIES

Conditions that must remain true for QuantumSafe Code & Firmware Signing.

These points come from the product profile, not from a shared disclaimer.

NEXT STEP

Define a controlled pilot: QuantumSafe Code & Firmware Signing

Select one application, exact versions, measurable acceptance criteria and rollback.